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Abstract
This article offers an analysis of the transnational discursive construction processes informing Latin American security governance in the aftermath of 9/11. It demonstrates that the
Global War on Terror provided an opportunity for external and aligned local knowledge
producers in the security establishments throughout the Americas to reframe Latin
America’s security problems through the promotion of a militarised security epistemology,
and derived policies, centred on the region’s ‘convergent threats’. In tracing the discursive
repercussions of this epistemic reframing, the article shows that, by tapping into these discourses, military bureaucracies throughout the Americas were able to overcome their previous institutional marginalisation vis-à-vis civilian agencies. This development contributed to
the renaissance of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism discourses and policies in the
region, allowing countries such as Colombia and Brazil to reposition themselves globally by
exporting their military expertise for confronting post-9/11 threats beyond the region.
Keywords: Global War on Terror; epistemic communities; counter-insurgency; counter-terrorism;
Colombia; Brazil

Introduction
This article addresses the transformation of Latin America’s security environment
in the aftermath of 9/11 in order to explain the resurgence of counter-terrorism and
counter-insurgency-related discourses and policies in the region. It argues that
9/11, together with the global revival of counter-insurgency, from the mid-2000s
onwards, provided an opportunity for an ‘epistemic community’, composed out
of external and aligned local actors in the security policy establishments throughout
the Americas, to recast the region’s security problems. This community facilitated
the movement of a Global War on Terror (GWOT)-related security epistemology to
Latin America. In turn, by discursively framing the region’s contemporary security
problems as ‘convergent threats’ – often understood in terms of a ‘crime–terror–
insurgency nexus’ – these actors managed to adapt post-9/11 global security epistemologies to Latin American realities. In essence, this reframing allowed for connecting the region’s security problems to a GWOT-inspired vocabulary,
© The Author(s) 2020. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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emphasising the terrorist/insurgent qualities of criminal actors in the region while
embedding them within a global post-9/11 threat scenario. As a consequence,
counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism discourses and policies, which often
tend to be associated with Latin America’s past, have resurfaced, partly by enabling
a reappearance of military discourses and practitioners from the ‘Global Cold War’
(GCW).1 Accordingly, by tapping into these discourses, military bureaucracies
throughout the Americas were able to expand their budgets and overcome their
previous institutional marginalisation vis-à-vis civilian agencies. This development,
moreover, has provided Latin American countries, such as Colombia and Brazil,
with an opportunity to reposition themselves globally by (re)branding and exporting their military expertise as a model for confronting ‘convergent’ post-9/11 security
threats beyond the region.
In developing these arguments, the article makes three contributions to the
debates on Latin America’s ‘violent’2 and ‘securitized’3 democracies. First, it
assesses the impact of 9/11 on the ways security is governed and violence addressed
in the region, topics that have received little attention in contemporary debates.
Second, the article explores the transnational dimension of security governance
in contemporary Latin America. Although much is known about national and subnational causes and consequences of violence in the region, together with efforts to
counter them,4 the debate has not yet been upscaled to the level of transnational
interactions. Stated otherwise, scholars have largely ignored asking how these
local processes are embedded in ongoing reconfigurations of transnational security
governance – in particular after 9/11. On the flipside, the possible ways that related
Latin American developments have implications beyond the region have been left
uncharted. Third, the article unpacks some of the taken-for-granted epistemic
underpinnings of the ideas about how to counter violence and govern security in
the region, where they come from, who imports them and to what effect. In fact,
scholars too often tend to assume the validity of policy vision and practitioners’
ideas regarding how to counter violence and govern security. In turn, successes
or failures of particular security models are analysed without delving into the
knowledge economies that make certain policies travel.5
1
Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
2
Enrique Desmond Arias and Daniel M. Goldstein (eds.), Violent Democracies in Latin America
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010).
3
Jenny Pearce, ‘Perverse State Formation and Securitized Democracy in Latin America’, Democratization,
17: 2 (2010), pp. 286–306.
4
See, for example, Enrique Desmond Arias, Criminal Enterprises and Governance in Latin America and
the Caribbean (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Graham Denyer Willis, The Killing
Consensus: Police, Organized Crime, and the Regulation of Life and Death in Urban Brazil (Oakland,
CA: University of California Press, 2015); Tina Hilgers and Laura Macdonald (eds.), Violence in Latin
America and the Caribbean: Subnational Structures, Institutions, and Clientelistic Networks (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2017); Benjamin Lessing, Making Peace in Drug Wars: Crackdowns and
Cartels in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Wil Pansters (ed.), Violence,
Coercion, and State-Making in Twentieth-Century Mexico (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012).
5
But see Paul Hathazy, ‘Punitivism with a Human Face: Criminal Justice Reformers’ International and
Regional Strategies and Penal-State Making in Argentina, Chile and Beyond’, Kriminologisches Journal,
48: 4 (2016), pp. 294–310; Louise Wiuff Moe and Markus-Michael Müller, ‘Counterinsurgency,
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On the following pages, these issues will be explored through an analytical narrative that will assess the epistemological underpinnings of contemporary policy
discourses gravitating around ‘convergent’ security threats in Latin America by
assessing how the actors involved discursively ‘construct their policy arguments’6
and to what effect. By drawing upon an analysis of government and policy documents as well as informal and formal military doctrinal publications – and without
claiming to offer an exhaustive account of these processes – the narrative will zoom
in on key actors and developments that facilitated Latin America’s integration into
the GWOT. To this end, the narrative will follow the multi-scalar (global, national,
regional) travels of the post-9/11 security epistemology and the ‘actor-network’ that
created the underlying conceptual framing of crime–terror–insurgency ‘convergences’, from the battlefields of the GWOT, to the United States, Latin America
and beyond.

Converging Post-9/11 Threats
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 profoundly transformed the global security environment. Today, there seem to be widespread international concerns regarding the global threat potential of Islamist terrorism,7 whose transnational structures, religious
inspiration and increased operational lethality seem to indicate a ‘new’ quality of
the contemporary terrorism landscape.8
Latin America, however, is rarely perceived as a target of Islamist terrorism. As a
recently published report by the US Congressional Research Service argues,
‘[c]ompared to other parts of the world, the potential threat emanating from terrorism is low in most countries in Latin America’. The acts of terrorism that are
identified in the report predominantly occur in the Andean region of South
America, committed by two Colombian guerrilla groups – Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, FARC)
and Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army, ELN) – and one
Peruvian guerrilla group, Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path, SL).9 As these insurgent groups are neither Islamist nor new threats to the affected countries, the question arises how and why a region that is not home to, nor significantly targeted by,
transnational Islamist terrorism became integrated into the post-9/11 security context. To answer this query, the role of epistemic communities in the rise of the ‘new
Knowledge Production and the Traveling of Coercive Realpolitik between Colombia and Somalia’,
Cooperation and Conflict, 53: 2 (2018), pp. 193–215.
6
Frank Fischer, ‘Policy Analysis in Critical Perspective: The Epistemics of Discursive Practices’, Critical
Policy Studies, 1: 1 (2007), p. 103.
7
See, for example, United Nations Security Council, 7272nd Meeting, ‘Threats to International Peace and
Security’ (New York: UN, 2014); United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Foreign Terrorist Fighters:
Manual for Judicial Training Institutes, South-Eastern Europe (Vienna: UNODC, 2017); US Department
of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, Country Reports on Terrorism
(Washington, DC: Department of State, 2017), pp. 9–13.
8
Peter R. Neumann, Old and New Terrorism: Late Modernity, Globalization and the Transformation of
Political Violence (Cambridge: Polity, 2009), pp. 14–48.
9
Mark P. Sullivan and June S. Beittel, Latin America: Terrorism Issues (Washington, DC: Congressional
Research Service, 2016), p. i.
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counterinsurgency era’10 within the context of the GWOT needs to be assessed.
These communities managed to promote a post–9/11 security worldview that discursively connects the issues of insurgency and terrorism by stressing the connections between these phenomena, on the one hand, and relating them to crime, on
the other. In making this security epistemology, gravitating around concepts such
as the crime–terror–insurgency nexus,11 travel to Latin America, these communities
adapted its underlying threat scenario and policy prescriptions to the region’s realties by reframing criminal actors, such as street gangs, as terrorists and/or insurgents,12 as well as placing them in a global post-9/11 context.
Travelling Epistemologies

As with all other forms of governance, security governance – including threat perceptions as well as related prescripts on how to tackle them – is related to dominant
forms of knowing, or epistemologies, which construct political reality and ways of
ordering it. This construction is based on making truth claims concerning governance problems and solutions that are grounded in knowledge.13
When it comes to particular policies, globally dominant epistemologies reflect
the power and influence of what Peter M. Haas termed ‘epistemic communities’.
These communities are composed of networks of recognised experts who share a
‘set of normative and principled beliefs’. Members of epistemic communities usually have a ‘competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policyrelevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area’.14 They also often share a
common educational, institutional and/or professional background and seek to
transform a current state of affairs by mobilising their acquired, collectively shared
and recognised knowledge.15 As epistemic communities operate in a highly competitive economy, their claim to be in the exclusive possession of uniquely relevant
knowledge for solving pressing governance problems is crucial for prevailing in
such an environment by enabling an epistemic community to credibly uphold
the claim of knowing the ‘way forward’. Accordingly, an epistemic community’s
power depends upon the promotion of specific ‘success models’ and solutions to
10
David Ucko, The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009).
11
Michael Miklaucic and Jacqueline Brewer, ‘Introduction’, in Michael Miklaucic and Jacqueline Brewer
(eds.), Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization (Washington, DC:
National Defense University Press, 2013), p. xiii. This nexus is also discussed as the ‘crime-terror continuum’ or the ‘crime-terror interface’; see Peter Grabosky and Michael Stohl, Crime and Terrorism (Los
Angeles, CA: Sage, 2010), pp. 6–8, 71–86.
12
Markus-Michael Müller, ‘Punitive Entanglements: The “War on Gangs” and the Making of a
Transnational Penal Apparatus in the Americas’, Geopolitics, 20: 3 (2015), pp. 696–727; Elana Zilberg,
Space of Detention: The Making of a Transnational Gang Crisis between Los Angeles and El Salvador
(Durham: Duke University Press 2011), pp. 220–7.
13
Jan-Peter Voß and Richard Freeman (eds.), Knowing Governance: The Epistemic Construction of
Political Order (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
14
Peter M. Haas, ‘Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination’,
International Organization, 46: 1 (1992), p. 3.
15
Susana Durão, ‘Formação internacional, comunidades de saberes e mudança institucional: os oficiais
de polícia africanos formados em Lisboa’, Revista Brasileira de Segurança Pública, 9: 1 (2015), pp. 131–2.
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address governance problems in a way that derived policy proposals resonate with
changing global (geo)political context conditions and related preferences – normative, political and economic – of policy-makers. Other relevant factors include the
authority of the knowledge producers themselves, which is related to the power/
influence of the network in which they are embedded as well as the related access
to dominant policy actors and institutions, both at home and abroad.16
These communities, as Haas argues, ‘are channels through which new ideas circulate from societies to governments as well as from country to country’ by articulating ‘cause-and-effect relationships of complex problems, helping states identify
their interests, framing the issues for collective debate, proposing specific policies,
and identifying salient points for negotiation’.17
Epistemic communities, in this regard, are important for assessing the mobility
of policies as well as the multi-scalar institutional and personal networks involved
in their construction.18 These communities provide for the ‘social infrastructure’ of
globally mobile policies, as Jamie Peck and Nik Theodore have shown, which creates deep interconnections amongst people, institutions and places by enabling a
‘cross-referential intensity’ in and through which particular policy ideas come to
express a commonly shared consensus regarding ‘models’, ‘best practices’, new governance technologies and problem framings.19 Such shared consensus, before it
becomes official policy, however, is established through a more subterranean process in which new epistemologies circulate throughout expert networks, often in
informal ways, and regularly through publications.20
Publications are indeed the core means for the dissemination of an epistemic
community’s ‘new ideas’ and the emergence of a network-wide accepted epistemic
vocabulary. The latter usually takes the form of concepts, such as the ‘crime–terror–
insurgency nexus’, which form the ‘analytical backbone’ of mobile policies.21 These
concepts render particular contexts legible, make them comparable and allow them
to be linked, against the backdrop of analytically pre-established categories through
which initially unrelated objects are grouped together ‘as instances of the same kind
of thing’.22 Such concepts are brought to life through the collective work of epistemic networks and the associations of the actors involved. As Christian Bueger
and Felix Bethke have put it by drawing on insights from Bruno Latour’s actornetwork theory:23

Moe and Müller, ‘Counterinsurgency’, p. 207.
Haas, ‘Introduction’, pp. 27, 2.
18
Tim Newburn, Trevor Jones and Jarrett Blaustein, ‘Policy Mobilities and Comparative Penality’,
Theoretical Criminology, 22: 4 (2018), p. 572.
19
Jamie Peck and Nik Theodore, Fast Policy: Experimental Statecraft at the Threshold of Neoliberalism
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2015), p. xxiv.
20
Graham Ellison and Nathan W. Pino, Globalization, Police Reform and Development: Doing it the
Western Way? (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 78.
21
Peck and Theodore, Fast Policy, p. 67.
22
Nick Riemer, ‘Internalist Semantics. Meaning, Conceptualization and Expression’, in Nick Riemer
(ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Semantics (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), p. 32.
23
Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2005).
16
17
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Initially, a concept is an effect of a web of associations. A novel concept is an
innovation brought about by such a web. Understanding the life of the concept
is to investigate the work that goes into weaving this net – to study the actors
who conduct this work and are part of the net […] The materials that make up
a network giving life to a concept are mainly texts and actors producing these
texts, reading these texts and adjusting their [discursive] behaviour to these
texts.24
In line with actor-network theory, focusing on the conceptual work of epistemic
communities – together with the underlying dynamics of the ‘web of associations’
that connects people, institutions and places – offers a methodological roadmap for
studying these processes from a relational perspective. Latour’s proposal ‘to follow
the actors themselves’, which requires trying to ‘catch up with their often wild
innovations’ while recognising ‘the multiplicity of agencies’25 involved in rendering
policies mobile, allows institutional, geographic and actor-related ‘interconnections’
to be uncovered. As Timothy Mitchell puts it, one can ‘establish the routes along
which facts [and the concepts rendering them legible] can travel and be confirmed’
by examining the wider ‘political and intellectual arrangements of which they form
a part’.26
Emphasising such ‘interconnections’ calls for a focus on local interests that
embrace externally provided models and concepts as well as on the wider resonances such models have in specific contexts. Such resonance and appeal usually
imply a conceptual reassembling through which local actors cherry-pick the symbolic, material, discursive and/or practical elements of mobile policies that are
most relevant for pursuing their own interests. This involves a transformation of
the original ideas and models according to local needs.27
By concentrating on the role of epistemic communities in the resurgence of
counter-insurgency within the context of the GWOT, and by following the actors
as well as travelling concepts involved – which have increasingly interwoven the
issues of (counter)insurgency, (counter)terrorism and crime – the remainder of
this article will demonstrate how and why Latin America ‘entered’ the global
post-9/11 security context.
The New Counter-Insurgency Era

Around 2005–6, counter-insurgency witnessed a revival within the GWOT, notably
within the United States. Faced with continuous setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan,
the US military initiated a practical and doctrinal shift from ‘conventional’ warfare
towards more ‘unconventional’ counter-insurgency operations.28 The growing
attention paid to counter-insurgency within the GWOT, which has been portrayed
24
Christian Bueger and Felix Bethke, ‘Actor-networking the “Failed State”: An Enquiry into the Life of
Concepts’, Journal of International Relations and Development, 17: 1 (2014), pp. 40–1.
25
Latour, Reassembling the Social, pp. 12, 260.
26
Timothy Mitchell, ‘The Work of Economics: How a Discipline Makes its World’, European Journal of
Sociology, 46: 2 (2005), p. 304.
27
Peck and Theodore, Fast Policy, p. 29.
28
Ucko, The New Counterinsurgency Era.
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as a new ‘prototypical form of warfare’ marked by ‘a mutation or fusion of insurgency and terrorism’,29 has increasingly bound together counter-insurgency and
counter-terrorism to an extent that successfully combatting terrorism also means
countering insurgencies, and vice versa.
Debates on terrorism and insurgency, moreover, have increasingly focused on
crime. In fact, it became more and more clear that many GWOT insurgents, notably
the Taliban in Afghanistan, financed their activities through criminal activities, particularly drug trafficking. As influential policy scholar Vanda Felbab-Brown puts it:
Afghanistan has become one of the most important locations in the U.S. struggle against terrorism, along with Iraq, its main theater of counterinsurgency
operations against the resurgent Taliban, which has been deeply involved in
the drug trade despite first proscribing it as un-Islamic. Thus, for the
United States, Afghanistan has come to epitomize the nexus of drugs and
insurgency.30
Such reasoning on the ‘nexus of drugs and insurgency’ was especially well received by
US government officials, who, already before 9/11, had started to worry about crime–
terrorism ‘convergences’. Apparently evidenced by the fact that the financing of terrorist organisations throughout the world, to varying degrees, depends upon drug
trafficking, fears about such convergences also enveloped Latin America, particularly
Colombia. Here, FARC’s ability to control parts of Colombian territory, in addition
to its alleged ties to the Russian mafia and Mexican cartels, transformed Colombia’s
security context. As Michael A. Sheehan, then-coordinator for counter-terrorism at
the Department of State (DoS), expressed in 2000, Colombia became ‘the primary
example of narcoterrorism in the world where the drug trade is a major factor in terrorism activities’.31 These worries were exacerbated by 9/11. And at a critical GWOT
juncture, publications, such as the ones by Felbab-Brown, made the idea of a nexus
between drugs, terrorism and insurgency so popular32 that in the wider US foreign
policy establishment the crime–terror–insurgency nexus became part and parcel of
official policy discourses.
This points towards the influence of an epistemic community within the US
security establishment, which Thomas E. Ricks terms ‘COINdinistas’: a network
of people whose epistemological work facilitated the resurgence of counterinsurgency in the US military and foreign policy establishment.33 Institutionally
and personally connected by a shared professional interest, or what Haas calls a
‘common policy enterprise’, the actor-network comprising the COINdinistas can
be analysed as an epistemic community because the actors involved share ‘a set
29
Robert M. Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular
War (Westport, CN: Praeger, 2006), p. 15.
30
Vanda Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs (Washington, DC:
Brookings, 2009), p. 9.
31
‘Threat Posed by the Convergence of Organized Crime, Drug Trafficking and Terrorism. Hearing
before the Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 13
Dec. 2000’ (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2000), pp. 31, 13.
32
Strobe Talbott, ‘Foreword’, in Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up, p. ix.
33
Thomas E. Ricks, ‘The COINdinistas’, Foreign Policy, 30 Nov. 2009.
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of common practices associated with a set of problems to which their professional
competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will
be enhanced as a consequence’.34 Enhancing ‘human welfare’, in this case, means
promoting counter-insurgency.
This epistemic community emerged with the post-9/11 revival of the GCW-era
US (counter)insurgency industry, a network of people and institutions addressing
policy demands for actionable (counter)insurgency knowledge,35 now reborn as a
‘counterterrorism/counterinsurgency industry’.36 In addition to militaries and
intelligence services, this industry is composed of government agencies, such as
parts of the DoS, or the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID), academics, journalists, think tanks, public and private research institutions, such as the Research and Development (RAND) Corporation, the National
Defense University (NDU) or the Center for a New American Security (CNAS),
as well as private contractors and consultants.37 This community, whose main
activity is the production and dissemination of insurgency-related knowledge,
managed to reframe the problems in Afghanistan and Iraq through the lens of
counter-insurgency and provide derived policy recommendations regarding the
‘way forward’. Its most influential members, as identified by Ricks,38 include:
General (ret.) David Petraeus, former commander of the International Security
Assistance Force in Afghanistan and commanding general of the Multi-National
Force – Iraq; Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) John A. Nagl, former CNAS vice-president;
David Kilcullen, a former Australian soldier and advisor to the DoS as the chief
strategist in the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism and one of the
world’s leading counter-insurgency theoreticians;39 Janine Davidson, at that
time director of stability operations capabilities within the Office for Special
Operations/Low Intensity Conflict of the US Assistant Secretary of Defense, as
well as founding director of the Consortium for Complex Operations, which later
became the NDU-based Center for Complex Operations;40 and Dave Dilegge,
founder and co-editor-in-chief of the Small Wars Journal (SWJ), which by that
time ‘became a must read for people in uniform who were looking for answers
to the problems they faced in Iraq and Afghanistan’.41
In 2006, the epistemic work of the COINdinistas culminated in the publication
of the US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual FM 3-24 (hereafter
Haas, ‘Introduction’, p. 3.
Steven Metz, ‘Rethinking Insurgency’, in Paul B. Rich and Isabelle Duyvesteyn (eds.), The Routledge
Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), p. 32, fn. 1.
36
Jeremy Scahill, Dirty Wars: The World is a Battlefield (New York: Nation, 2013), p. 468.
37
Nathan Hodge, Armed Humanitarians: The Rise of the Nation Builders (New York: Bloomsbury, 2011),
pp. 10–16, 181–2, 268; Fred Kaplan, The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American
Way of War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2013), pp. 98, 140–1.
38
Ricks, ‘The COINdinistas’.
39
Key publications include David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of
a Big One (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Counterinsurgency (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2010); Coming Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla (Oxford: Oxford University,
2013).
40
See http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/cco-update-new-home-for-the-consortium-for-complex-operations,
last access 15 Jan. 2020.
41
Hodge, Armed Humanitarians, p. 150.
34
35
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FM 3-24),42 which moved counter-insurgency from an ‘enemy-centric’ towards a
‘population-centric’ focus. Instead of just killing adversaries, this meant stressing
‘[t]he importance of protecting the populace, gaining people’s support by assisting
them, and using measured force when fighting insurgents’.43 Rebranding counterinsurgency as ‘population-centric’ included conceptual work that – partly by drawing on Max Weber’s understanding of political authority and Robert D. Putnam’s
concept of ‘social capital’44 – turned the ‘protecting the people’ mantra into military
doctrine by reconceptualising counter-insurgency as a form of ‘armed social work’,
seeking ‘to redress basic social and political problems while being shot at’.45 Part of
the social and political problem that needed addressing was crime, in particular
drug trafficking. As FM 3-24 puts it: ‘Sustainment requirements often drive insurgents into relationships with organized crime or into criminal activity themselves.
Reaping windfall profits and avoiding the costs and difficulties involved in securing
external support makes illegal activity attractive to insurgents. […] Drugs retain the
highest potential for obtaining large profits from relatively small investments.’46
In many ways, this perspective revived late GCW framings regarding the connections between drug trafficking, terrorism and insurgencies. Exemplified by
National Security Division Directive (NSDD) 221, signed by President Ronald
Reagan in April 1986, such framings articulated national security concerns regarding ‘nations with a flourishing narcotics industry, where a combination of international criminal trafficking organizations, rural insurgents, and urban terrorists
can undermine the stability of the local government’.47
Back then, such reasoning reflected the conservative zeitgeist, as, for many US
citizens, drug trafficking was the main international concern.48 In turn, supporters
of the militarisation of the drug war could claim both a moral high ground and
popular legitimacy. Following the issuing of NSDD 221, security bureaucracies –
including those working on Latin America, and specifically the US Department
of Defense (DoD), which in 1988 became ‘the single lead agency for the detection
and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United
States’49 – benefitted from this militarised reframing of ‘interconnected’ drug trafficking through enhanced budgets, new forms of interagency cooperation and the
provision of new ‘opportunities to test equipment, personnel and tactics’.50
The end of the GCW marked a shift from such militarisation efforts and underlying geopolitical agendas towards a more civilian-led law enforcement approach to
42

See Kaplan, The Insurgents.
FM 3-24, 5-65. (Please note that military doctrinal publications, usually, have no page numbers.
Throughout this article, the numbers/letters noted after such publications refer to paragraphs/subsections.)
44
Ibid., 3-61, 3-63.
45
Ibid., A-45.
46
Ibid., I-56.
47
‘NSDD 221: Narcotics and National Security’ (Washington, DC: The White House, 1986), p. 2, available at www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90B01390R000100120029-5.pdf, last access 28
Feb. 2020.
48
Ted Galen Carpenter, Bad Neighbor Policy: Washington’s Futile War on Drugs in Latin America
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 32.
49
US Congressional Record. ‘Proceedings and Debates of the 100th Congress, Second Session, Vol. 134,
Pt. 18’ (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 26331.
50
Carpenter, Bad Neighbor Policy, p. 32.
43
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drug trafficking. This partly reflected civilian security agencies’ ability to capitalise
on GCW framings of drug trafficking as a national security threat in their search for
new post-Cold War security missions, allowing them to enhance their international
presence in places now ‘vacated’ by the military.51 In turn, related security budgets
focused on law enforcement efforts that prioritised interagency cooperation
between the Department of Justice, the DoS and the Department of Treasury,
thereby somewhat marginalising the DoD and its late-Cold War approach to
drug trafficking – globally and in Latin America.52
Accordingly, from the early to mid-1990s onwards, and in line with a broader
US effort for democracy promotion in the region, counter-narcotics security assistance increasingly focused on civil police forces, rule of law promotion and law
enforcement efforts,53 with most of the direct US involvement being coordinated
by the DoS’ Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. As
a derived effect, the US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), responsible for
Latin America – with the exception of Mexico – was turned into the weakest of
the US unified combatant commands. After the GCW, the war on drugs was literally the only war left to fight in the western hemisphere, and SOUTHCOM was
forced to take on a more indirect, supportive role vis-à-vis its civilian counterparts
now conducting most operations on the ground in the region.54
This development was reversed by 9/11. It triggered a significant shift of
resources from the DoS to the DoD, giving the latter a key role in shaping US foreign policy by framing it in GWOT terms. For Latin America, this implied a
strengthening of SOUTHCOM as a key agenda-setter. By jumping on
Washington’s counter-terrorism agenda, SOUTHCOM has been able to secure
and legitimise an expanded budget.55 In turn, this triggered a wider shift in perspectives on hemispheric security issues, contributing to the fact ‘policymakers elsewhere in the U.S. government have begun to approach Latin America from a
disproportionately security threat-based point of view’.56 The rediscovery of the
drug trafficking–terrorism–insurgency linkages in the region was part and parcel
of this development. And, by adapting GWOT-related security epistemologies
to Latin American realities, a Latin America-focused subgroup of the abovementioned epistemic community was a key driving force behind this development.
51

Ethan Nadelmann, Cops across Borders: The Internationalization of U.S. Criminal Law Enforcement
(University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), p. 473.
52
Peter Andreas and Ethan Nadelmann, Policing the Globe: Criminalization and Crime Control in
International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 169–74.
53
Stephen Johnson, Johanna Mendelson Forman and Katherine Bliss, Police Reform in Latin America:
Implications for US Policy (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic Studies and International Affairs,
2012), pp. 16–17. See also Rachel Neild, ‘U.S. Police Assistance and Drug Control Policies’, in Coletta
A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin (eds.), Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy
(Boulder: CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005), pp. 61–97.
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Democracy, pp. 28–32.
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Constructing Latin America’s Criminal Insurgencies

From the mid-2000s onwards, this subgroup – with close links to many of the previously mentioned outlets of the post-9/11 ‘counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency
industry’, and often with direct work experiences regarding Latin American security
issues (the actor-network includes former GCW warriors, security consultants, US
law enforcement personnel and scholars working on the region, often at military
research institutions) – discursively reconfigured policy framings of the region’s
crime problems that fuelled the above-mentioned ‘threat-based’ policy view on
Latin America. Key to this was conceptual work that culminated in the invention
of a generic insurgency concept, that of ‘criminal insurgencies’, with the community connecting this reframing to post-9/11 US homeland security discourses and
the GWOT. In doing so, this actor-network discursively expanded counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism logics into the realm of law enforcement while
subjugating the latter to military prerogatives in order to confront the region’s
‘criminal insurgents’ and ‘convergent threats’. By drawing practical similarities
between ‘classic’ and ‘criminal’ insurgents, the latter, in turn, have been elevated
above the realm of ordinary ‘local’ criminality and instead portrayed as part of a
global post-9/11 threat context, as they are classified as warfighting actors with
the potential to connect with transnational terrorist groups.57
The core of this epistemic community – its key conceptual innovators – includes
people like Robert J. Bunker. Currently an adjunct research professor of the US
Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), he has published dozens of
articles and books on matters of counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, gangs
and drug trafficking.58 Other core members of this community include John
P. Sullivan, who previously worked as a police officer. Currently a senior fellow
at the Center for Advanced Studies on Terrorism, Sullivan is also an adjunct
researcher at the Bogotá-based VORTEX Research Group, where he has published
on issues such as drug wars and criminal insurgency.59
Another particularly influential member of this epistemic community is Max
G. Manwaring. A retired research professor of military strategy at SSI, Manwaring
served in SOUTHCOM’s politico-military directorate and the Defense Intelligence
Agency during Latin America’s GCW endgame in El Salvador, where he had ‘conducted a quantitative study on the variables that determined (or at least were correlated with) success or failure in COIN campaigns since World War II’.60 Based at
SOUTHCOM’s Small Wars Operational Requirements Division (SWORD), he
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522e46_64dcc8cb6b4640209667fe1acb3ff35f.pdf, last access 15 Jan. 2020.
60
Kaplan, The Insurgents, p. 158.
57

556

Markus‐Michael Müller

developed what later on became known as the ‘SWORD model’, or ‘Manwaring
paradigm’, in counter-insurgency.61 Manwaring’s work on the role of legitimacy
in counter-insurgency also influenced FM 3-24.62 He is the author of Street
Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency63 and recently published a trilogy64 that explains
how Latin American street gangs, Cuban and Venezuelan popular militias,
Argentine piqueteros (picketers) and Mexican cartels turned into actors seeking
to ‘neutralize, control, depose, or replace an incumbent government’ and ‘in
doing so, radically change the traditional authoritative allocation of values (governance) to the values of the reigning criminal and/or insurgent leaders’.65
This actor-network has a node that associates all of the above-mentioned people
as well as other core members of this epistemic community who gave life to the
criminal insurgency concept: the SWJ’s El Centro initiative, a website dedicated
to the ‘analysis and discussion of Latin America’s guerrilla wars and criminal insurgencies’.66 The website presents the initiative with the following words: ‘El Centro is
SWJ’s focus on small wars in Latin America. The elephant in the hemispheric room
is clearly the epidemic criminal, cartel and gang threat, fueled by a drug and migration economy, rising to the level of local and national criminal insurgencies and a
significant U.S. national security risk.’67
The website offers a reading list on these topics, as well as a list of El Centro
fellows. These include the above-mentioned persons, as well as influential
Washington-based, Latin America-focused security consultants and policy scholars,
such as Douglas Farah, Vanda Felbab-Brown and Robert Killebrew, but also actors
from the region. The latter comprise Mexico City-based journalist Ioan Grillo,
author of El Narco: Inside Mexico’s Criminal Insurgency,68 and Robert Muggah,
founder of the influential Brazilian think tank Igarapé Institute. In a recent article
(co-authored with Sullivan), Muggah observed that ‘today’s warriors are just as
likely to be affiliated with drug cartels, mafia groups, criminal gangs, militias,
and terrorist organizations as with armies or organized rebel factions’. The resulting
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‘cocktail of criminality, extremism, and insurrection’, in turn, would require a ‘comprehensive approach’ that recognises ‘crime wars as wars’.69
Such fellows are presented as people who ‘have expertise in and commitment to
Latin America, support SWJ’s particular focus on the small wars in the region, and
agree with SWJ’s general approach to advancing discussion and awareness in the
field through community dialog and publishing’. From the analytical perspective
of this article, these actors can be perceived as people who share the SWJ’s epistemic
worldview. Accordingly, affiliation with El Centro can be seen as a membership
card for this epistemic community and a commitment to its ‘policy enterprise’ of
developing ‘a better understanding of the national and regional challenges underlying past, present, and future small wars’ in Latin America70 – particularly through
conceptual work, the related adjustment of the actors’ discursive behaviour and
resulting conceptual cross-referential intensity. All of this is centred on, recall,
the reframing of contemporary Latin American security issues through the conceptual lens of ‘criminal insurgencies’. A widely cited SWJ article on Mexico provides
the following definition:
In describing cartel operations as a criminal insurgency, we do not suggest that
the cartel structures are operating a unified operation against the Mexican
state. […] We also do not mean to suggest that the goal of the criminal insurgent, like that of both classical and modern political insurgents – [sic] is the
removal of foreign forces, the satisfaction of discrete political demands, or
regime change. The criminal insurgent is resolutely apolitical; he challenges
the will of the state because he seeks to sever its regulatory arms.71
Another key feature of these criminal insurgencies, according to several El Centro
fellows, is that they are potentially ‘interlocking’ with terrorism,72 thereby transforming ‘criminal networks’ into ‘a gateway for terrorists’,73 by weaving together
‘[c]rime, terrorism and insurgency’ in ‘ways that threaten not just the welfare but
also the security of societies in the western hemisphere’. Accordingly, ‘[t]he
United States must lead a hemisphere-wide effort to confront and defeat the cartels’
threat to civil society’.74
In order to assess the impact of this epistemic community in line with the analytical framework developed above, it is instructive to trace the reappearance of the
conceptual underpinnings of this epistemology in official policy discourses as
Robert Muggah and John. P. Sullivan, ‘The Coming Crime Wars’, Foreign Policy, 21 Sept. 2018.
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evidence of policy actors’ discursive adjustments to the community’s worldview. In
turn, this requires an assessment of policy actors’ interests in recasting Latin
America’s security issues through the epistemological prism provided by this
actor-network.
Epistemological Resonances

By the mid-2000s, several developments in the United States – cutting across global,
regional, domestic and policy dynamics while connecting past lessons with contemporary needs – intersected, creating a nascent opportunity structure that gave
increasing authority and legitimacy to this epistemic worldview in the US security
and foreign policy community by recasting Latin American security problems, and
possible solutions, in (counter)terrorism and (counter)insurgency terms.
First, and embedded in the DoD’s growing policy influence as well as
SOUTHCOM’s post-9/11 resurgence, there was the Bush administration’s positive
re-evaluation of the US ‘small footprint’ counter-insurgency effort during El
Salvador’s civil war (1980–92), which increasingly became seen as a success in
counter-insurgency-driven democratisation, state-building, and human rights protection that could be turned into a model for the campaigns in the GWOT.75 Stated
otherwise, it was now acceptable to talk positively about Cold War counterinsurgencies in Latin America as successful militarised nation-building efforts
with a democratising potential. Second, and around the same time, US domestic
security issues, including immigration and border security, became reframed as
terrorism-centred homeland security topics. This process was accompanied by a
growing awareness of the potential dangers and opportunities the US southern border represents regarding transnational homeland security threats, such as illegal
immigration, transnational gang activities, drug trafficking and their convergence
with terrorism.76 Third, this awareness, in turn, overlapped with the mediatised
escalation of the Mexican drug war – early on presented by Mexican President
Felipe Calderón Hinojosa (2006–10) as a fight against ‘delinquency and terrorism’77 –
connected with growing fears regarding the potential risk of state failure in Mexico
and elsewhere in the region.78 Fourth, there was the more general GWOT-related renaissance of counter-insurgency, including derived concepts, to which the SWJ community
already contributed by establishing the journal as an authoritative source of practical
guidance.
In this context, post-9/11 counter-insurgency concepts, ideas about ‘convergences’, and derived militarised solutions, for many people within the US security
and foreign policy establishments, offered a promising way to recast the ways hemispheric security could be improved by countering Latin American ‘criminal insurgencies’ – in particular because of the more than meagre results of less militarised
75
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forms and framings of Latin American security governance, notwithstanding
decades-long US support79 and growing concerns about the possible presence of
transnational terrorism in Latin America. In turn, this process could build on,
while also amplifying, the immediate post-9/11 framing of FARC as a drug-funded
terrorist organisation by the Colombian government and the Bush administration
(see below), enabling the US government to legitimise the narcoguerrilla concept
and redirect counter-narcotics aid towards counter-terrorism efforts, which, in
turn, took on an increasing counter-insurgency outlook.80
These overlapping developments provided this epistemic community with all the
previously mentioned requirements for successfully promoting their own worldview
to a policy audience in search of security ‘success stories’. They popularised their perspectives and concepts in policy reports and publications, as well as testimonies in
several post-9/11 related committee hearings for the US Congress and Senate.
These hearings, in particular, became a platform for reiterating the community’s epistemic worldview to a broader policy audience outside the journal’s main practitioner
audiences. For example, in 2014, at a hearing before the US House Foreign Affairs
Committee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade, Farrah described FARC as
‘a prototype of the coming hybrid terrorist-criminal insurgencies’, whose operational
environment (OE) has been created by states like ‘Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia and
Ecuador’, which enabled ‘the FARC, Hezbollah, Iranian officials, ETA, Brazilian drug
trafficking organizations and others [to] meet in safety, exchange lessons learned and
build networks of convenience’.81
A few years earlier, in 2011, Felbab-Brown, in a written statement for a hearing
before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps and Global
Narcotic Affairs, argued that ‘[t]he penetration of the illicit economies by terrorist
or insurgent groups provides an especially potent threat to states and regional stability since belligerent groups typically seek to eliminate the existing state’s presence in
particular locales or countries’.82 To counter this threat, she proposed a populationcentric counter-insurgency approach to counter drug trafficking in the region by ‘directly defeating the belligerents and protecting the population’.83 A few months later,
Bunker was invited to give testimony at a joint hearing before the Subcommittee on
the Western Hemisphere on the Mérida Initiative. On this occasion, Bunker made a
policy recommendation that reiterated the above-mentioned epistemic worldview by
placing Latin America in the post-9/11 security context:
79
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Due to the evolution of the cartels and gangs into new warmaking entities [… ],
the Merida [sic] Initiative and others like it directed at Colombia and Central
America need to evolve to a more encompassing scope and scale and with a
greater sense of strategic urgency than most congressional policymakers
might a priori think is necessary. Following the 10-year anniversary of 9/11,
the key strategic insight that I offer is this: […] The cartels and narco-gangs
of the Americas, with those in Mexico of the highest priority, must now be elevated to the number one strategic threat to the United States.84
Statements like these, together with the underlying conceptual work of the epistemic
community, increasingly informed post-9/11 budgetary activities, legal initiatives and
security assistance towards Latin America. For example, in 2011, Bill H.R. 3401 was
proposed by the chairperson of the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere,
Connie Mack. Named the Enhanced Border Security Act, the bill reiterates the convergent threat scenario by calling for the application of ‘counterinsurgency tactics
under a coordinated and targeted strategy to combat the terrorist insurgency in
Mexico waged by transnational criminal organizations’.85 One year earlier, when
the Obama administration had already included the crime–terror–insurgency
nexus into its official strategy,86 then-US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated
that ‘we face an increasing threat from a well-organized network drug trafficking
threat that is, in some cases, morphing into or making common cause with what
we would consider an insurgency in Mexico and in Central America’.87 And the
US embassy in Brazil posted on its website a White House statement on the topic,
which argued that ‘[t]errorists and insurgents increasingly are turning to TOC [transnational organised crime] to generate funding and acquire logistical support to carry
out their violent acts’, thereby contributing to ‘the convergence of threats that were
once distinct and today have explosive and destabilizing effects’.88
By that time, and despite the fact that the empirical evidence for the scope and
actual impact of these convergences seems rather weak – with publications often
being speculative, under-referenced, and heavily reliant on media reports as well
as official sources pointing towards ‘possible’ or ‘alleged’ connections89 – the
84
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post-9/11 security epistemology also started to appear in US security assistance programmes towards the region. For example, the DoD-funded Haiti Stabilization
Initiative implemented a ‘community counterinsurgency’ programme in support
of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which made
efforts to confront the ‘criminal insurgency’90 waged by local street gangs and
other non-state, armed actors, who were also framed as terrorists by the Haitian
government and the UN bureaucracy.91
Another example of this is USAID’s incorporation of FM 3-24 concepts, such as
the clear-hold-build (C-H-B) approach,92 into community policing schemes of the
Central American Security Initiative (CARSI).93 In fact, many post-9/11, US-driven
security cooperation programmes with Latin America through initiatives such as
CARSI, the Mexico-centred Mérida Initiative, Plan Colombia or the Andean
Regional Initiative, the latter of which is an expanded version of Plan Colombia,
are marked by the growing recognition that, in the words of a former advisor to
the Bush administration, ‘the U.S. cannot continue to make a false distinction
between counterinsurgency and counter-narcotics efforts’.94 Accordingly, US
security aid channelled through these initiatives includes a strong counterinsurgency focus, often framed as ‘stabilisation’ (see below).95
These initiatives are an integral element of a worldwide expansion of post-9/11
US security assistance programmes that aim at capacity building of local partner
forces, notably in the realms of ‘counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and defense
institution building’.96 Accordingly, US security assistance programmes doubled
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from 57 in 2001 to 117 in 2017, totalling US$20 billion. While the majority of this
money is earmarked for initiatives in Africa, the Middle East, Iraq and Afghanistan,
78 of these programmes can operate in Latin America and the region received
US$20.5 billion in security assistance during this period.97 Nearly US$3.6 billion
of this assistance has been provided by the DoD through Section 1004 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 1998 and Section 1033
of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1998,98 both of which provide
the DoD with a counter-narcotics budget that can be used for equipping, training
and supporting other countries’ counter-narcotic activities. Additionally, and specifically targeting Colombia, Section 1021 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for FY 2005 provides the DoD with funds ‘to support a unified campaign by
the Government of Colombia against narcotics trafficking and against activities
by organizations designated as terrorist organizations’, which include insurgent
groups like FARC and ELN, as well as Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia
(United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia).99
Likewise, the DoD’s counter-narcotics strategy acknowledges that ‘the potential
nexus among illegal traffickers, terrorists, and insurgents is becoming a commonly
recognized national security threat’.100 For confronting such ‘hybrid criminalterror-insurgent threats’, the DoD seeks to link its fight against TOC to ‘other
national security priorities’, such as ‘counterterrorism’.101 This includes Latin
America. Reflecting the placement of the region within the GWOT, the DoD’s
counter-narcotics efforts explicitly seek to ‘disrupt the nexus between illicit drugs
and foreign terrorist organizations operating in and from South and Central
America, focusing on linkages with the Middle East and Africa’.102
Although these developments demonstrate how much the crime–terror–insurgency nexus epistemology is shaping contemporary US security assistance programmes towards Latin America, in order to fully uncover the southwards travel
of this security epistemology, Latin American actors and their interests in incorporating this epistemology into local security discourses and policies need to be assessed.

Embracing the Nexus
After the issuing of National Security Council Resolution 5432/1 in 1954, which
called for ‘[t]he ultimate standardization of Latin American military organization,
training, doctrine and equipment along U.S. lines’,103 the GCW produced deep
97
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entanglements between the United States and most Latin American militaries
through doctrinal input and practical advice, specifically in the area of counterinsurgency.104 These entanglements survived the end of the GCW and they were
revived with the increasing militarisation of the war on drugs by the administration
of George Bush Sr.,105 and, in particular, 9/11.
Examining currently valid Latin American military doctrine is particularly instructive for understanding the ongoing relevance of such entanglements as well as for following the travels of the ‘convergence’-centred security epistemology ‘down south’ by
tracing the reappearance of related concepts in Latin American military doctrine.
Doctrinal Entanglements

Military doctrine is the medium through which military knowledge production as
well as the concepts informing it get translated into practice. Doctrine defines an
‘approved set of principles and methods, intended to provide large military organizations with a common outlook and a uniform basis for action’.106 Doctrinal publications are shaped by internal stimuli, such as institutional cultures and previous
military experiences, as well as by external influences.107 Regarding the latter, it is
important to recognise that militaries are inherently transnational institutions,
embedded in the circulation of personnel, doctrine and practices across countries
and regions.108 Military doctrine, in this regard, is a prime example of global policy
mobility and the simultaneity of transfer and translation processes regarding the
localisation of externally provided epistemologies.
In order to understand why Latin American militaries translated the convergencecentred security epistemology into local military doctrine, it has to be recalled that
while most of the region’s armed forces have decades-long counter-insurgency
experience, their leading role in the region’s GCW fight against ‘subversion’, as
well as the resulting human rights violations, was also the main source for international and domestic criticisms. Accordingly, the return to civilian rule implied
efforts to demilitarise security governance and downsize military budgets, as well
as enhance civilian control over the militaries.109
Tapping into the post-Cold War drug war discourse during the 1990s offered
some kind of substitute for ‘weakened’ militaries in the Americas by providing
ongoing material support as well as a ‘visceral image of an utterly evil adversary’
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designating the drug cartels.110 While this also allowed for some counterinsurgency practices to survive under drug war frameworks and specially trained
counter-narcotics units, overall counter-insurgency was marginalised, although it
never disappeared, in post-Cold War Latin America.
Against this background, strategically harnessing the post-9/11 security epistemology can be seen as a way of countering this marginalisation through an upgrading
recycling, or ‘upcycling’, of already-existing counter-insurgency capacities. As the
crime–terror–insurgency nexus discourse elevates criminal actors beyond the
realm of ordinary lawlessness by portraying them as a military/terrorist threat,
embracing this epistemology allows for a rebranding of law enforcement/public
security issues as military/national security problems. In turn, in adjusting their discursive behaviour, Latin American militaries can strengthen/regain their legitimacy
as domestic security actors by portraying themselves as the institutions capable of
confronting the region’s ‘crime wars’ and their potential convergence with terrorism. Following from this, the rebranding calls for ‘new rules of engagement’,111 justifies increased military expenditures112 to confront threats from gangs, insurgents
and drug cartels,113 and requires more counter-insurgency and counter-terrorismfocused domestic security responses and expertise.114 The latter is not only deemed
necessary due to the potential links between criminals, insurgents and transnational
terrorists, but also because the violence of the former is increasingly framed by
Latin American security analysts and practitioners through a terrorism lens.115
Taking a closer look at newly issued military doctrine from Brazil and Colombia –
the two countries with the highest military expenditures in the region116 – illustrates
110
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this ‘upcycling’ of local military doctrine through a re-articulation of domestic
counter-insurgency experiences with the post-9/11 security epistemologies and concepts discussed above.
From the mid-2000s onwards, Brazil sought to adapt its defence strategy to the
realities of a GWOT-shaped global OE. For example, in 2005, the Brazilian Defence
Ministry stated that ‘non-governmental actors, new threats and the opposition
between nationalism and transnacionalism [sic] permeate international affairs
and the security arrangements of States’. Accordingly, ‘transnational crimes of different nature and international terrorism’ have turned into ‘menaces to peace, to
security and democratic order’.117 In order to adapt to these changes, Brazil’s military embarked on a doctrinal renewal process. In line with the ‘improvement’ and
deepening of US–Brazil defence cooperation under the Lula da Silva (2003–11) and
Rousseff (2011–16) governments,118 post-9/11 US doctrine was a key reference in
this process for Brazil.
A 2013 presentation by the Centro de Doutrina do Exercito (Brazilian Army
Doctrine Centre, CeDoutEx), for instance, opened with quoting parts of a West
Point speech by then-US Minister of Defence Robert Gates. In his speech, Gates
laid out the future panorama facing the US Army by stating that ‘[w]hat we can
expect in the future is that potential adversaries – be they terrorists, insurgents, militia groups, rogue states, or emerging powers – will seek to frustrate America’s traditional advantages […] From the look of things, the Army will not repeat the
mistakes of the past, where irregular warfare was shunted to the side after
Vietnam.’ Accordingly, preparedness for such missions is crucial, as ‘from the
Mayaguez to Grenada, Panama, Somalia, the Balkans, Haiti, Kuwait, Iraq, and
more – we had no idea a year before any of these missions that we would be so
engaged’.119 To avoid having ‘no idea’ about such engagements, the CeDoutEx
presentation outlined the new OE for Brazil’s armed forces. In addition to presenting a continuum of the spectres of possible contemporary conflicts, ranging from a
‘stable peace’ to an ‘unstable peace’, ‘insurgency’ and ‘total warfare’, it portrays the
current OE in GWOT terms. For example, by stressing the role of the ‘human terrain’,120 the presence of ‘new actors’, and its ‘selective lethality’.121
One year later, with the publication of the Brazilian Army’s Land Warfare
Manual (EB20-MF-10.102), these reflections were turned into military doctrine.
EB20-MF-10.102 lays out the country’s post-9/11 threat scenario, both domestic
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and international, in the following way: ‘The growing significance of transnational
groups or insurgents, with or without political and material support from other
countries, amplifies the diffuse nature of the threats to be countered by the use
of the defence forces.’122 And in defining the OE to be navigated by a Força
Terrestre Componente (Land Force Component, FTC), it states:
The complex environment in which a FTC operates contains a multiplicity of actors
which, in an integrated way and under certain conditions, can constitute a hybrid
threat. This type of threat unites the underlying dynamics of, even if diverse, regular
and irregular forces, searching to attain mutually beneficial goals. In some cases, this
type of threat can include terrorist cells and/or criminals.123
Moreover, the Brazilian military’s recently published Pacification Field Manual
(EB-20-MC-10.217)124 – which defines and formalises the military’s role in international and domestic pacification operations and whose reference materials include
FM 3-24 and the controversial Human Terrain Handbook, as well as several NDU and
Military Review publications on counter-insurgency and stability operations – introduces key post-9/11 counter-insurgency ideas. These include the ‘protecting the people’ mantra,125 the C-H-B approach,126 and the centrality of knowing, navigating and
controlling the ‘human terrain’.127 By integrating these concepts derived from
post-9/11 US military doctrine, the manual explicitly seeks to upgrade Brazil’s long
domestic experience with pacification, which, as is rightly stressed, dates back to
the nineteenth century,128 to the ‘complexities of the contemporary operational
environment’.129 These complexities, as the preceding quote from EB20-MF-10.102
makes clear, are marked by ‘hybrid’ threats that echo the crime–terror–insurgency nexus.
The Colombian military’s recently published Damascus Doctrine is even more
explicit. Even though no new counter-insurgency manual has been published
due to the negative attention the country’s military has received because of its
counter-insurgency outlook,130 ideas of ‘convergences’ as well as the crime–terror–insurgency nexus loom large in Colombia’s ‘post-conflict’ military doctrine,
which, again, has been greatly influenced by post-9/11 US doctrine and underlying
epistemologies. In fact, as Colonel Pedro Javier Rojas Guevara, the director of the
Centro de Doctrina del Ejército Nacional stated, currently valid post-9/11 US doctrine ‘has been the model for the “Damascus” project, with which the Colombian
Army seeks to generate and adapt its doctrine to the contemporary and future
122
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social, economic, political and geostrategic conditions, until 2030’.131 Colombia’s
stabilisation manual (MFRE 3-07 Estabilidad)132 is even numerically named after
FM 3-07 Stability Operations,133 which can be seen as an updated version of FM
3-24 for the ‘small footprint’ era (see below).134
MFRE 3-07 considers stability operations as being inherently related to counterinsurgency. It advises counter-insurgents to ‘take into account the history of
[Colombia’s] internal conflict that has demonstrated that insurgent groups show a
strong tendency to associate with and execute delinquent activities (including transnational crimes, such as drug trafficking, illegal arms trafficking, and illegal mining)
[…] This, in general, has the consequence that these groups convert themselves into
hybrid threats with a higher warfighting capacity.’135 Echoing Brazil’s EB20-MF10.102, a ‘hybrid threat’ is defined as ‘the dynamic and diverse combination of regular and irregular forces, terrorist forces and/or criminal elements united to achieve
mutual benefits’.136 In order to counter such ‘irregular threats’, the following five
operations, either ‘as a sequence, in parallel or in combination’, need to be executed:
•
•
•
•
•

Counterterrorism.
Unconventional Warfare.
Foreign Internal Defence (for external operations).
Counterinsurgency.
Stabilisation Tasks.137

While Brazilian and Colombian military doctrine thus incorporated basic post-9/11
security epistemologies and concepts, this did not happen through a simple doctrinal transfer from the United States. Rather, it resulted from an upcycling process
that combined epistemological borrowings from abroad with long-standing domestic counter-insurgency experiences (for example, the references to Brazil’s long
pacification experience and Colombia’s internal conflict) – experiences that were
the product of earlier forms of epistemological transfer and translation.138
The strong local interests behind this development can be further illustrated with
regards to the third of the above-mentioned operations – ‘Foreign Internal
Defence’, another conceptual borrowing from US doctrine.139 This term indicates
131
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that, far from being exclusively situated at the receiving end of GWOT-related epistemic ‘transfers’, countries such as Colombia and Brazil are actively involved in the
global circulation of the latter via the export of their upcycled counter-insurgency
expertise.
The Import-Export Business of Counter-Insurgency

After 9/11, Andrés Pastrana Arango’s government (1998–2002) successfully managed to ‘invite’ the United States to intervene in Colombia. This was achieved by
linking up with the Bush administration’s declaration of a ‘war against terrorism’:
on the one hand, by reframing FARC as a terrorist organisation financed through
drug trafficking140 – which also provided the Bush administration with an opportunity to demonstrate that its war on terror was not specifically about Islamic terrorism but terrorism in general141 – and, on the other hand, by engaging in what
Arlene B. Tickner calls a strategic ‘self-orientalisation’, which presented Colombia
as lacking sufficient military and state capacity to tackle this criminal-terroristinsurgency threat in the western hemisphere. The Bush administration ‘accepted’
this invitation and removed ‘the (fuzzy) line between counternarcotics and counterinsurgency/counterterrorism’. In turn, US assistance under a GWOT-revamped
Plan Colombia was now used ‘to professionalize and modernize the armed forces in
their battle against leftist insurgents’ – especially under the banner of President
Álvaro Uribe Vélez’s (2002–10) domestic ‘democratic security’ policy.142
Colombia’s military success in weakening FARC after the mid-2000s, culminating
in the 2016 peace accord, coincided with a shift in US preferences from ‘big footprint’ counter-insurgency campaigns towards leaner ‘small footprint’ stabilisation
approaches centred on cooperating with local counter-insurgents, notably Special
Operations Forces. Likewise, Colombia was turned into a global model for confronting the crime–terror–insurgency nexus through ‘locally owned’ counterinsurgency. Notwithstanding substantial human rights violations, as well as the
subjugation of police and basic governance functions under counter-insurgency
logics,143 this model became increasingly promoted by key COINdinistas,144 the
Obama administration,145 and the Colombian government, which sought to exploit
the opportunity to reposition itself as a global security exporter. As Uribe’s successor Juan Manuel Santos (2010–18) stated in 2015 at a UN peacekeeping conference:
‘Colombia has a successful experience in the fight against terrorism, drugtrafficking, insurgency, [and] transnational crime and we are ready to share this
140
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with the world.’146 In addition to increasing Colombia’s international visibility, this
export strategy has also provided a solution to the somewhat inevitable downsizing
of Colombia’s military in the ‘post-conflict’ context. Sharing Colombian security
expertise ‘with the world’, in this regard, also allows ‘for putting this surplus
capacity to effective use abroad’,147 thereby avoiding potential military resistance
against post-conflict restructuring.
The means of choice for exporting Colombia’s counter-insurgency experience
has become the country’s ‘democratic security diplomacy’ as well as its
‘International Cooperation Strategy for Integral Security’. Under these labels,
Colombia started exporting its expertise in confronting ‘terrorism, drug-trafficking,
insurgency, [and] transnational crime’ abroad, notably to Africa148 and Latin
America, where, since 2010, Colombian advisors started training security personnel
in Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Panama
and Peru.149
Colombia’s success on the counter-insurgency front also inspired Brazil. In fact,
Rio de Janeiro’s pacification programme, in operation since 2008, was initially
influenced by the Uribe government’s first urban counter-insurgency campaign,
Operación Orión, launched in Medellín in 2002. Insights from Medellín travelled
back to Rio de Janeiro and from there onwards to Haiti, where – under the
umbrella of MINUSTAH and within Brazil’s overall strategy of carving out a
more visible and influential position in the UN system – Brazilian soldiers, in
their fight against the ‘criminal insurgency’ waged by street gangs, experimented
for the first time with the C-H-B approach.150
The results of this experience not only travelled back to Brazil, where they fed
into doctrinal revision processes and the framing of local gangs as ‘insurgents’
with potential ties to terrorist groups like Hezbollah and FARC by MINUSTAH
veterans such as Brigadier General Roberto Escoto (a 1982 graduate of the
Agulhas Negras Military Academy who was also involved in the pacification of
the favela Maré and, after he went into reserve ranks in 2016, founded Brazil’s
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first private military company, Áquila Internacional)151 or Colonel Allessandro
Visacro (for whom ‘“high-intensity criminality”’ in Brazil would acquire the characteristics of ‘what many call “criminal insurgency”’).152 These MINUSTAH results
also spread globally. For example, Brazil is involved in confronting the crime–terror–insurgency nexus in West Africa. In 2013, when the United Nations Office on
Drugs and Organized Crime (UNODC) started worrying whether ‘insurgents and
extremists throughout the region [West Africa] would be in a position to facilitate
[cocaine] trafficking, thus drawing resources to their cause and increasing the
potential for violence’,153 Brazil started exporting its pacification expertise westwards. Under the umbrella of a UNODC initiative, Brazil became involved in the
creation of a training centre in Guinea-Bissau to ‘improve security forces capacities
to counter narcotics and organized crime’, with the long-term goal of transforming
the centre into a ‘Regional Training Academy for Portuguese-speaking countries in
Africa’.154
Brazil also participates in the UN’s post-9/11 interventionism. MINUSTAH’s
Force Commander (2007–09) Lieutenant General Carlos Alberto dos Santos
Cruz (a GCW veteran who joined the Brazilian Army four years after the coup
of 1964) was assigned to take over the command of the United Nations
Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(MONUSCO) in 2013 in recognition of his achievements in stabilising Haiti by,
as he put it, showing ‘no tolerance for the kidnappings, harassment and terror carried out by criminal gangs’.155 Under his leadership, MONUSCO’s Force
Intervention Brigade was set up, which has been replicating several of the counterinsurgency practices – including drone operations and the use of special forces –
used for suppressing Haiti’s ‘criminal insurgency’, thereby transforming
MONUSCO into the most violent UN mission so far.156
Brazil’s counter-insurgency efforts abroad have also had more recent domestic
repercussions. Within the context of interim President Michel Temer’s (2016–18)
federal intervention between February and December 2018 – the first since the
end of military rule – in Rio de Janeiro, which placed the military in control of public security, several key actors and discourses from Brazil’s overseas pacification
efforts travelled home.157
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The federal intervention, in fact, has frequently been justified with the successful
participation of the Brazilian military in stabilising Haiti. By applying the aboveanalysed discursive logic that elevates local crime problems to the level of military
conflict, Brazil’s current President Jair Messias Bolsonaro (2019–present), shortly
after his election in 2018, stated: ‘We are at war. Haiti was also at war. [In Haiti]
you found an element with a firearm, you shoot, and then you see what happened.
You solve the problem.’158 Likewise, the troops involved in the federal intervention,
many of which participated in MINUSTAH, trained the local police forces based on
a course that was similar to the training that MINUSTAH troops received prior to
their deployment, thereby deepening the counter-insurgency outlook of local security governance by familiarising police officers with the post-9/11 security epistemology that informed EB-20-MC-10.217 and MINUSTAH’s anti-gang operations in
Port-au-Prince.159

Conclusion
Latin American militaries are usually portrayed as inherently national institutions.
The findings of this article challenge this perspective, and instead show that Latin
American militaries are deeply embedded in transnational relations. This has been
demonstrated through an analysis of the epistemological work of a transnational
‘actor-network’ involved in reframing the region’s security problems in GWOT
terms, and by following the circulation of the underlying concepts and derived policies to the region and beyond. In and through the resulting transnational embedding, globally dominant security epistemologies are reaffirmed, brought into
circulation, translated, incorporated into Latin American military doctrine – and
exported. While the latter development is a more recent phenomenon, the transnational epistemological aspects and geopolitical dynamics that permeate the
former have been a constant feature of Latin American military development
throughout the twentieth century, if not earlier. Latin American militaries have
always had a predominantly inward-looking perspective. Officially, however, they
were supposed to counter external enemies. In this context, the alignment of
local military doctrine and practice with globally dominant security epistemologies,
by recasting internal security problems in light of global threat perceptions, provides for otherwise hard-to-find legitimating narratives as well as locally and externally provided resources to combat domestic foes.
The alleged recent return of the region’s militaries,160 in this regard, is not a
return at all. In many ways, militaries were never gone. They were only marginalised as internal coercion wielders for the relatively short period between the
end of the GCW and the GWOT. What was gone, however, was a global epistemological frame of military reference that could tie local security problems to globally
envisioned battle spaces, with domestic theatres of operation turning into ‘glocal’
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battle grounds in the militaries’ fights against internal security threats with alleged
external connections.
Following 9/11 and the related recasting of local crime problems through a
GWOT-oriented militarised security epistemology, this globality has been restored.
Accordingly, the region’s military institutions, particularly in highly violent contexts such as those of Brazil and Colombia, have been able to tap into this reframing, contributing to enhanced domestic influence, international legitimacy, growing
budgets and external deployments. This highlights the resilience of Latin American
militaries, including their capacity to update their long-standing ‘professionalism of
internal warfare’ as well as the resulting ability of ‘military role expansion’161
according to the strategic embrace of globally dominant threat perceptions, underlying epistemologies and concepts. Recognising this calls for a new research agenda
on the region’s militaries beyond formal-institutionalist approaches of civil-military
relations or simplifying understandings of ‘militarisation’, which often, due to their
built-in methodological nationalism and lack of deeper engagements with the
transnational epistemological bases of military vision and practice, are unable to
capture these dynamics.
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Spanish abstract
Este artículo ofrece un análisis de los procesos de construcción discursiva transnacional
que permearon a la gobernanza de seguridad latinoamericana en las postrimerías del
9/11. Demuestra que la Guerra Global contra el Terror fue una oportunidad para los productores externos de seguridad y los productores locales alineados con éstos en las
Américas para redefinir los problemas latinoamericanos de seguridad a través de la
promoción de una epistemología de seguridad militarizada, y sus políticas derivadas,
que se centró en las ‘amenazas convergentes’ de la región. Al rastrear las repercusiones
discursivas de este replanteamiento epistémico, el artículo muestra que al aprovechar
tales discursos, las burocracias militares a lo largo del continente pudieron superar su previa marginación institucional vis-à-vis las agencias civiles. Tal desarrollo contribuyó al
renacimiento de los discursos y políticas de contra-insurgencia y contra-terrorismo en
la región, permitiendo a países como Colombia y Brasil reposicionarse globalmente al
exportar su conocimiento militar para confrontar las amenazas post 9/11 más allá de la
región.
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Portuguese abstract
Este artigo oferece uma análise dos processos de construção discursivos transnacionais que
informaram a governança de segurança da América Latina após os atentados de 11 de
Setembro. O artigo demonstra que a Guerra Global contra o Terror providenciou uma
oportunidade de alinhamento entre inteligências internacionais e locais nas seguranças
internas em grande parte das Américas. Isso se deu com o intuito de re-enquadrar os problemas de segurança da América Latina através da promoção de epistemologia de
segurança militarizada e suas políticas derivadas, centrada nas ‘ameaças convergentes’
da região. Ao traçar as repercussões discursivas desse re-enquadramento epistêmico,
este artigo mostra que ao acessar estes discursos, burocracias militares em todas as
Américas foram capazes de superar sua marginalização institucional anterior em
comparação às agências civis. Este desenvolvimento contribuiu para o renascimento de
discursos e política de contra-insurgência e contra-terrorismo na região, o que permitiu
que países como Brasil e Colômbia se reposicionassem no cenário global através da
exportação de seus conhecimentos militares usados para combater ameaças pós 11 de
Setembro na região.
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